The British military spent 20 years fighting in Afghanistan. Considering the UK’s achievements against its objectives, defeat seems the most accurate description of the campaign’s outcome. How institutions respond to and learn from failure is a good measure of their effectiveness. But Britain's war in Afganistan also saw considerable tactical and operational learning to solve complex problems. Not only are some of the solutions valuable, but the processes by which they were derived bear study. The question is whether these lessons will be retained. This Whitehall Paper delves into some of the many valuable and hard-won lessons that can be derived from a study of British operations in Afganistan, beginning a conversation as to their relevance for future British miliatry undertakings.

Jack Watling is Senior Research Fellow for Land Warfare at RUSI. Jack works closely with the British military on the development concepts of operations and assessments of the future operating environment and conducts operational analysis of contemporary conflicts. Jack’s PhD examined the evolution of Britain’s policy responses to civil war in the early 20th century. He has worked extensively on Ukraine, Iraq, Yemen, Mali, Rwanda and further afield. He is a Global Fellow at the Wilson Center in Washington, DC.